UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
In The Matter Of MDMA SCHEDULING
Docket No. 84-48
OPINION AND RECOMMENDED RULING, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
ON ISSUES TWO THROUGH SEVEN
FRANCIS L. YOUNG, Administrative Law Judge
Appearances:
STEPHEN E. STONE, ESQ.
CHARLOTTE A. JOHNSON, ESQ.
Counsel for the Drug Enforcement Administration
RICHARD COTTON, ESQ.
Counsel for Lester Grinspoon, M.D., George Greer, M.D.,
James Bakalar and Thomas B. Roberts, Ph.D.
ROBERT T. ANGAROLA, ESQ.
ROBERT A. DORMER, ESQ.
Counsel for Hoffman-LaRoche Inc. and McNeilab, Inc.
LYN B. EHRNSTEIN, ESQ. Pro Se
DAVID E. JORANSON
for State of Wisconsin Department of Health
and Social Services Controlled Substances Board Pro Se
This is a rule making proceeding pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act as
amended [1] (the Act or the CSA) to
determine in which schedule, if any, of
the five schedules established by the Act, the substance 3, 4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine, also known as MDMA, should be placed. The
proceeding is being conducted pursuant to Subchapter II of Chapter 5 of Title
5, United States Code, the Administrative Procedure Act, after opportunity
for a hearing. [2]
The Act itself placed a great many substances in one schedule or another. It
vested the Attorney General with the authority, after considering several
prescribed factors, to place other substances in appropriate schedules, to
move substances from one schedule to another, and to de-schedule them. That
authority has been delegated to the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA). [3]
At the commencement of this proceeding in July 1984 MDMA was not listed in
any schedule. At that time DEA published in the Federal Register [4] a
notice of proposed rulemaking to place the substance in Schedule I. A number
of persons filed comments and objections and requested a hearing. This
administrative law judge was requested by the then-Deputy Administrator to
preside and to provide the Administrator with a certified record and
recommended findings of fact, conclusions of law and decision.
At a preliminary prehearing conference of participants on February 1, 1985 it
was suggested that one of the issues identified presented a purely legal
question which might be decided without the need of any evidence and in
advance of the other issues in the case. (The Deputy Administrator had
specified this issue as one on which a recommended conclusion was to be
prepared for the Administrator.) After considering memoranda submitted by the
participants the administrative law judge agreed and accepted the suggestion.
The judge called for briefs from the parties on that issue. It was
designated issue number 1, and was stated thus:
1. Assuming that a substance has a potential for abuse and has no currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, can the substance be
placed in any schedule other than Schedule I?
After studying the briefs the judge issued a recommended decision on that
issue, dated June 1, 1985. He recommended, first, that the language of the
Act was such that a substance with a potential for abuse less than a "high"
potential, and having no currently accepted medical use in treatment, cannot
be placed in any of the five schedules. (Clearly, a substance with a
"high" abuse potential and no accepted medical use in treatment, must be
placed in Schedule I.) Alternatively the judge recommended, based upon court
decisions interpreting the Act, actions of the Congress, legislative history
and DEA's own past actions, that such a substance should be placed in either
Schedule III, IV or V depending upon its degree of potential for abuse. In a
letter to the administrative law judge dated October 7, 1985 the
Administrator advised that he had decided not to issue a final agency ruling
on that initial issue until he had received the entire record at the
conclusion of the case.
Meanwhile, the proceeding continued with respect to the remaining issues.
Direct examination testimony of all witnesses was submitted in written
narrative form. Exhibits were identified and submitted. Hearing sessions
for cross-examination of witnesses were held in Los Angeles, California,
Kansas City, Missouri and Washington, D.C. on June 10, July 10 and 11,
October 8, 9, 10 and 11 and November 1, 1985. The participants [5] submitted
briefs and proposed findings and conclusions, and oral argument was heard in
Washington, D.C. on February 14, 1986. [6]
The administrative law judge has carefully considered all the evidence of
record and the arguments of the participants, as well as the written comments
received during the comments period early on in the proceeding. He submits
herein to the Administrator his recommended findings, conclusions and
decision with respect to the issues other than Issue 1.
Section 812(b) of Title 21 U.S.C. provides that, aside from actions mandated
by certain international agreements, which are not applicable here, and
except in the case of an immediate precursor, with which we are not
concerned, "a drug or other substance may not be placed in any schedule
unless the findings required for such schedule are made with respect to such
drug or other substance." It is the responsibility of the Administrator of
DEA to make these findings after receiving an evaluation and recommendation
from the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) [7]
pursuant to $ 811(b). After making his findings, the Administrator is to
place the drug or substance in question in the appropriate schedule of the
five schedules established by the Act.
The findings required for placement in each schedule are set out in Section
812(b) as follows:
(1) Schedule I.
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.(B) The drug
or other substance has no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the
United States.(C) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or
other substance under medical supervision.
(2) Schedule II.
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.(B) The drug
or other substance has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the
United States or a currently accepted medical use with severe
restrictions.(C) Abuse of the drug or other substances may lead to severe
psychological or physical dependence.
(3) Schedule III.
(A) The drug or other substance has a potention for abuse less than the drugs
or other substances in schedules I and II.(B) The drug or other substance has
a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.(C)
Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to moderate or low physical
dependence or high psychological dependence.
(4) Schedule IV.
(A) The drug or other substance has a low potential for abuse relative to the
drugs or other substances in schedule III.(B) The drug or other substance has
a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.(C)
Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to limited physical dependence
or psychological dependence relative to the drugs or other substances in
schedule III.
(5) Schedule V.
(A) The drug or other substance has a low potential for abuse relative to the
drugs or other substances in schedule IV.(B) The drug or other substance has
a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.(C)
Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to limited physical dependence
or psychological dependence relative to the drugs or other substances in
schedule IV.
(Emphasis added).
Thus a finding must be made for each drug or other substance to be scheduled
as to whether or not it has a "currently accepted medical use in treatment in
the United States".
What constitutes such use? What does this phrase mean? How is the
Administrator to ascertain whether or not a drug has a currently accepted
medical use in treatment in this country? This is essentially a legal issue
of statutory interpretation. No findings of fact are called for.
To the Agency staff the answer is simple. They assert that "accepted medical
use" means approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of HHS pursuant
to the procedures established by Section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. $ 355. DEA need only ask FDA whether
the drug or substance in question has received FDA approval under the FDCA in
order to ascertain the existence, vel non, of "accepted medical use".
There is no denying that such a situation would greatly simplify the
scheduling task of the DEA staff. It provides a quick solution to the
problem for DEA. It provides a certain answer. But it is wrong.
The FDCA
The FDCA was enacted in 1938. It established procedures which a person must
follow, and approvals he must obtain, before he may introduce or deliver for
introduction into interstate commerce any new drug". 21 U.S.C. $ 355(a). In
a word the FDCA, as amended, requires that FDA must approve a new drug as
being safe and as being effective for a stated purpose - before it may be
introduced into interstate commerce in the United States. There is
nothing in that statute authorizing FDA to approve a new drug for use in
the practice of medicine by a licensed physician. The power to grant or
withhold such approval would constitute regulation of the practice of
medicine. The FDCA does not empower the FDA to do this. The FDA itself has
repeatedly stated that it is not empowered to attempt such regulation.
The question of FDA's authority in this regard has arisen when that agency
has considered the practice of physicians using marketed drugs for purposes
which the FDA has not approved. [8] In
1972, FDA summed up its view on this
subject when, in the preamble to a proposed rule on drug labeling, it stated:
If an approved new drug is shipped in interstate commerce with the approved
package insert and neither the shipper nor the recipient intends it be used
for an unapproved purpose, the requirements of section 505 of the Act are
satisfied. Once the new drug is in a local pharmacy after interstate shipment,
the
physician may, as part of the practice of medicine, lawfully prescribe a
different dosage for his patient, or may otherwise vary the
conditions of
use from those approved in the package insert, without informing or
obtaining the approval of the Food and Drug Administration.
This interpretation of the Act is consistent with congressional intent as
indicated in the legislative history of the 1938 Act and the drug amendments
of 1962. Throughout the debate leading to enactment, there were repeated
statements that Congress did not intend the Food and Drug Administration to
interfere with medical practice and references to the understanding that the
bill did not purport to regulate the practice of medicine as between the
physician and the patient. Congress recognized a patient's right to seek
civil damages in the courts if there should be evidence of malpractice, and
declined to provide any legislative restrictions upon the medical profession.
37 Fed. Reg. 16503 (1972).
Subsequently, in 1975, five years after enactment of the Controlled
Substances Act, the Food and Drug Administration wrote as follows:
The comments recommended that the proposed regulations be revised to require
an appropriate statement in package inserts that, in addition to the
conditions of use which the manufacturer may recommend to physicians in
compliance with the law and Food and Drug Administration regulations, there
are other conditions of use for which the drug may be regarded as safe and
effective on the basis of the experience of critical physicians using the
drug in the practice of medicine over a period of years.
The Commissioner stated in a separate notice of proposed rulemaking published
in the Federal Register of August 15, 1972 (37 Fed. Reg. 16503) [9],
concerning the use of a drug for conditions not included in its labeling,
that the labeling does not intend either to preclude the physician's use of
his best judgment in the interest of the patient or to impose liability if he
does not follow the package insert. The Commissioner clearly recognizes that
the labeling of a marketed drug does not always contain all the most current
information available to physicians relating to the proper use of the drug in
good medical practice. Advances in medical knowledge and practice inevitably
precede the labeling revision by the manufacturer and formal labeling
approval by the Food and Drug Administration. Good medical practice and
patient interest thus require that physicians be free to use drugs according
to their best knowledge and judgment. Certainly where a physician uses a
drug for a use not in the approved labeling, he has the responsibility to be
well informed about the drug and to base such use on a firm scientific
rationale or on sound medical evidence, and to maintain adequate medical
records of the drug's use and effects, but such usage in the practice of
medicine is not in violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
40 Fed. Reg. 15393-94 (1975) (emphasis added).
In 1979, the Food and Drug Administration once more reiterated this view:
Good medical practice and patient welfare require that physicians remain free
to use drugs according to their best knowledge and judgment .
44 Fed. Reg. 37435-36 (1979).
Once again, in June 1983, the FDA repeated its view that it does not have the
authority to regulate the practice of medicine:
Although no final rule has been issued on this subject, the Agency has
continued to apply the principle set forth in the preamble to the 1972
proposal. In FDA's Drug Bulletin of April 1982, the Agency sought to
clarify and reiterate the position that the Act does not regulate the
"practice of medicine." Once a drug product has been approved for marketing,
a physician may, in treating patients, prescribe the drug for use not
included in the drug's approved labeling. The primary legal constraints in
that situation are State laws on medical practice and products liability law.
The IND Rewrite proposal would codify the Agency's longstanding position that
the regulations do not apply to the "practice of medicine," though the
proposal does not purport to define with specificity such practice in terms
of the Act.
48 Fed. Reg. 2673 (June 9, 1983).
Finally, the Food and Drug Administration reemphasized this position in a
filing with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in 1983. In the course of its argument in the 1983 case, the FDA
emphasized the
commonly recognized exception to the Act's broad and protective coverage: the
'practice-of medicine' exemption. FDCA's legislative history expresses a
specific intent to prohibit FDA from regulating physicians' practice of
medicine. According to the Commissioner, FDCA does not regulate physicians
in their practice because physicians are licensed by the states. Letter from
the Commissioner at 3, JA 88.
Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
rev'd, ____
U.S. ____ , 84 L. Ed. 714 (1985). (Footnotes omitted).
A word of caution is called for. In the penultimate quotation above, the
phrase "approved for marketing" appears. This term is frequently used as a
substitute for the statutory language "introduced into interstate commerce".
Agency counsel slipped into this inaccuracy in oral argument on February 14,
1986. (Tr 10, p.6) It is important to keep clearly in mind what Congress was
doing when it enacted the FDCA in 1938 - it was regulating the interstate
commerce of substances. It was not undertaking to define the acceptable
practice of medicine. It was not attempting to provide a yardstick for
"accepted medical use".
The above-quoted statements by the FDA, which carries out the provisions of
the FDCA, provide no basis for turning to that statute for a determination of
what does or does not constitute "accepted medical use". Indeed, the FDA's
own pronouncements are clearly to the contrary.
DEA's brief in this proceeding points to another statement by FDA, in 1982,
prompted by efforts to "legalize" marihuana. In its published proposed
recommendations to DEA on the scheduling status of that substance and its
components, FDA said, referring to the language of $ 812(b):
FDA interprets the term "accepted medical use" to mean lawfully marketed
under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 301, et seq.
. .
. A drug may be marketed lawfully under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act after approval of a new drug application (NDA) for that drug. There are,
theoretically other ways in which a drug could be marketed legally. The drug
could satisfy either the requirements for exemption from the definition of
"new drug" in 21 U.S.C. 321(p) or the requirements for a "grandfather clause"
from the new drug approval provision. (47 Fed. Reg. 28150)
The Commissioner of FDA continued at page 28151 by saying:
The mechanism set up by Congress for lawful marketing of a new drug requires
submission of an NDA to FDA and FDA approval of that application before
marketing. Before FDA can approve an NDA, however, the drug sponsor must
submit data from an extensive battery of experimental testing on both animals
and humans to establish the drug's safety and effectiveness for its proposed
uses. In addition, the sponsor must submit data and manufacturing controls
demonstrating that standards of identity, strength, quality, and purity will
be met.
He concludes by saying:
Thus, the lack of an approved NDA for a drug substance leads FDA
to find
that a substance lacks "an accepted medical use in treatment" for two
reasons. First, if use of the drug is unlawful whenever interstate
commerce is involved, medical use of the drug cannot be classified as
accepted. Second, in the absence of the data necessary for approval of the
NDA, the agency has no basis for concluding that medical use of the drug in
treatment can be considered acceptable by medical standards.
The last quotation flies directly in the face of the preceding statements of
statutory interpretation by FDA, issued over a period of eleven years. It
represents a complete reversal of position with no stated basis whatsoever.
One can only conclude that, in the context of the battle over marihuana, FDA
temporarily lost sight of its long-acknowledged lack of statutory authority
to regulate the practice of medicine. Perhaps it failed to realize the full
effect of its statement. FDA is not charged with forming a conclusion,
binding on the medical profession, "that medical use of the drug in treatment
can be considered acceptable by medical standards." FDA is to pass on the
safety and efficacy of a drug simply and solely in connection with approving
it for "introduction into interstate commerce."
FDA is acting properly if it attempts to ascertain whether or not the medical
profession has accepted use of a drug in treatment as the agency determines
whether or not to allow the drug's introduction into interstate commerce.
Acceptance of use in treatment, with other factors, is certainly an
appropriate consideration. But nowhere in either statute, the FDCA or the
CSA, is it provided that FDA's fiat will be binding on the medical profession
with respect to what is, or is not, accepted medical practice or accepted
medical use.
There can be a very simple reason why there exists no NDA for a particular
drug and why FDA has not approved it for introduction into interstate
commerce: no one may have sought such approval from FDA. The fact
no one
has sought approval does not necessarily mean that no one is using the
drug
and that such use is not accepted by the profession. There are very real
economic factors affecting whether an NDA is sought for a drug.
Controlled Substances Act
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) was enacted in 1970, 32 years after the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. In 1970 the Congress was well aware of its 1938
handiwork. There are several specific references to the 1938 statute in the
1970 enactment. Thus we find in the CSA that "drug" is defined by specific
reference to a section of the FDCA; see 21 U.S.C. $ 802(12). Congress
excluded from the Attorney General's scheduling power any substance permitted
by the FDCA to be sold "over the counter and without a prescription"; see 21
U.S.C. $ 811(g)(1). Congress specifically referred to the investigational
new drug provisions of the FDCA in the CSA; see 21 U.S.C. $$ 827(c)(2)(A),
827(f). Other references to provisions of the FDCA are found in the CSA at
21 U.S.C. $$ 825(a), 825(b), 829(a) and 829(d). Congress could easily have
linked the phrase "accepted medical use in treatment" in the CSA to some
provision of the FDCA, and FDA's authority thereunder, had it desired to do
so. It did not do so.
The Agency's reply brief [10] refers
to the "somewhat sparse legislative
history of the Controlled Substances Act relating to 'accepted medical use'."
No participant quotes any comment on the meaning of this phrase from a
committee report or floor manager. However, there were references to the
phrase in the testimony of several witnesses.
Dr. John Jennings, then Acting Director of the Bureau of Drugs, FDA,
testified as follows at one point:
Q: Let me ask one question: when a drug is under investigation pursuant to
investigational new drug applications, is the drug considered to have an
accepted medical use?
Dr. Jennings: Usually not, although it might.
Q: Could you enlarge on that?
Dr. Jennings: Yes, sir. The exemption for investigational use is usually
granted for a drug for which the medical use has not been established so in
most cases that would be so, there would not be an accepted medical use.
However, drugs that have one or maybe several accepted medical uses might be
under investigation for additional medical uses.
Q: But in the great majority of cases --
Dr. Jennings: It would he true that the accepted medical use would not have
been established.
House Hearings, at 343 (emphasis added).
The subject came up also during the testimony of Michael R. Sonnenreich,
Deputy Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD),
DEA's predecessor agency, of John Ingersoll, Director of BNDD, and of Dr.
Roger Egeberg, Assistant Secretary of HEW. They testified as follows:
Mr. Sonnenreich: [Criterion] Two [no accepted medical use] is a factual
determination and normally where we get such information is through the AMA
or WHO. You don't have to be a doctor to find out whether or not it has an
accepted medical use in the United States or not. So the fact that you are
asking whether it has got accepted medical use is something that a lawyer
can find out as well as a doctor.
House Hearings, at 165 (emphasis added).
Mr. Rogers: Under Schedule I drugs. Would HEW or the Department of Justice be
able to determine on a drug a lack of accepted safety for use under medical
supervision?
Dr. Egeberg: I would think that HEW would expect to have a good deal to say
on that.
Mr. Rogers: All right. HEW would have the competence there. I think this
would be admitted. What about no accepted medical use in the United States?
Dr. Egeberg: Well, I would think that HEW would be the primary source,
through its various agencies and its contacts, for information on that
subject.
House Hearings, at 194 (emphasis added).
Mr. Ingersoll: I must also point out that this review [prior to
registration of researchers by the Department of Justice is only required for
Schedule I substances which the medical profession has already determined
have no legitimate medical use in the United States.
House Hearings, at 678 (emphasis added).
Mr. Rogers: So the only category of [Schedule] I is simply for research?
Mr. Sonnenreich: Yes, sir, and that is because they have no medical
use as determined by the medical community.
House Hearings, at 696 (emphasis added).
Mr. Sonnenreich: Mainly, our feeling is that the trigger on your Schedule I
drugs which are really different from your II, III and IV drugs. It is this
basic determination that is not made by any part of the federal government.
It is made by the medical community as to whether or not the drug has medical
use or doesn't.
Mr. Rogers: If it has medical use, Food and Drug probably would have
authorized it, wouldn't they?
Mr. Sonnenreich: I assume so, sir.
House Hearings, at 718 (emphasis added).
From the foregoing exchanges it clearly appears that the spokesmen for BNDD
and FDA were of the view in 1970 that one should turn to "the medical
community" to ascertain the existence of accepted medical use in treatment,
and that "a lawyer can find out as well as a doctor" whether such acceptance
exists, and that "this basic determination is not made by any part of the
federal government". [11]
This interpretation, provided to the Congress by Administration witnesses,
contemporaneously with enactment, is reasonable and authoritative. The
Congress has given no indication of having rejected it or of adopting
another. It is in accord with the plain meaning of the language in the
statute. The Congress had every opportunity to tie "accepted medical use" to
FDA actions under the FDCA. It did not do so. The only rational conclusion
is that it did not intend to do so.
Court Decisions
Court decisions have agreed with the FDA itself, and the BNDD spokesmen in
1970, that the FDA is not empowered to decree what is or is not proper
medical practice.
Congress did not intend the Food and Drug Administration to interfere with
medical practice as between the physician and the patient. Congress
recognized the patient's right to seek civil damages in the courts if there
should be evidence of malpractice and declined to provide any legislative
restrictions upon the medical profession. . . . Congressional intent set out
in 37 Fed. Reg. 16503 (1972) indicates the Congress did not intend the Food
and Drug Administration to interfere with medical practice and that the bill
did not purport to regulate the practice of medicine as between the physician
and the patient.
* * *
" . . . the physician can ascertain from medical literature and from medical
meetings new and interesting proposed uses for drugs marketed under package
inserts not including the new proposed usages . . . New uses for drugs are
often discovered, reported in medical journals and at medical meetings, and
subsequently may be widely used by the medical profession. . . . The
manufacturer may not have sufficient commercial interests or financial
wherewithal to warrant following the necessary procedures to obtain FDA
approval for the additional use of the drug. When physicians go beyond the
directions given in the package insert it does not mean they are acting
illegally or unethically and Congress does not intend to empower the FDA to
interfere with medical practice by limiting the ability of physicians to
prescribe according to their best judgment.
United States v. Evers, 453 F. Supp. 1141, 1149, 1150 (M.D. Ala.
1978),
aff'd 643 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1981). (Emphasis added.)
In its opinion affirming the District Court in Evers, the Fifth Circuit
observed:
***[T]he [FDCA] was intended to regulate the distribution of drugs in
interstate commerce, not to restrain physicians from public advocacy of
medical opinions not shared by the FDA.
United States v. Evers, 643 F.2d 1043, 1053, n. (1981).
Agency counsel's quote from the Fifth Circuit opinion in Evers (Reply
Brief, p. 9) simply expresses recognition of the FDA's lack of power to
regulate medical practice with reference to the specific facts of that case
which centered on the use of a non-prescription drug for a purpose other than
that stated in the package insert. The quotation in no way detracts from the
court's recognition of the basic principle. It reinforces it.
Uniform Controlled Substances Act
The plebiscite conducted by participant Joranson of state regulatory
officials is wholly irrelevant and immaterial. He asked them to express
their interpretations, as regulators, of language in the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act, not the language in the Federal statute with which we are
concerned. It is the medical community which is to be consulted on the
Federal statutory question, not state regulators working with different
statutes.
Classification Of Alphacetylmethadol
The Agency's discussion of Congress' treatment of alphacetylmethadol has no
relevance here. The Agency submitted a statement to the Congress about that
substance, that "since the current use of alphacetylmethadol is limited to
research, it has no currently accepted medical use. . . ." Whatever else was
said about that substance was surplusage with respect to its accepted medical
use.
Congressional Rescheduling of Methaqualone
In 1984 Congress enacted special legislation effectively placing the
substance methaqualone in Schedule I. [12] Agency counsel now point to one
sentence in a House Report concerning that legislation as evidencing an
understanding by the Congress that "accepted medical use in treatment" was
equated by the Committee with FDA "approval". Counsel's reliance on the
quoted statement is misplaced.
To begin with, the statement is wrong. The Committee Report says: "[T]he Drug
Enforcement Administration does not have authority to impose Schedule I
controls on a drug which has been approved by the Food and Drug
Administration for medical use". There is no such bar in the CSA. The CSA
does provide, in 21 U.S.C. $ 811(b) that "if the Secretary recommends that a
drug or other substance not be controlled, the Attorney General shall not
control the drug or other substance". But there is no language having the
effect of the quoted statement in the House Report.
The very next sentence in the House Report, not quoted in the Agency's brief,
is correct and does show the necessity for Congressional action to outlaw
methaqualone at that time. The sentence says:
The statutory findings required for agency scheduling decisions clearly state
that the agency may not, in the absence of Congressional action, subject
drugs with a currently accepted medical use in the United States to Schedule
I controls.
The Report continues:
There are circumstances when public health considerations require the
Congress to exercise its responsibility to determine whether the adverse
health effects caused by diversion of a drug outweigh its therapeutic
usefulness and therefore warrant impositions of Schedule I controls.
Although methaqualone currently has an accepted medical use, there is a
consensus of medical opinion that it has no unique therapeutic advantages
over other available drugs and has a significantly higher incidence of and
potential for abuse.
* * *
Should future research discover a new use for methaqualone or if it can be
clinically demonstrated that methaqualone possesses therapeutic advantages
not possessed by other sedative-hypnotic drugs, the Controlled Substances Act
specifies procedures for administratively removing the drug from Schedule I
and placing it in an appropriate schedule of the Act. [13]
The House committee was not focusing on the problem which concerns us at the
moment. But implicit in the above language is recognition that what the
medical profession is actually doing is not to be equated with an approval
action by the FDA. Indeed, the Report shows that the Committee listened to
the medical community. At least one physician is quoted in the Report, as is
a report adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Medical
Association.
The Agency brief states, p. 20:
*** By ordering the Secretary to withdraw the NDA for methaqualone, Congress
ensured that the drug then met all the criteria for control in Schedule I,
particularly that it had "no currently accepted medical use in treatment in
the United States".
Counsel are mistaken. A careful reading of the statute enacted reveals that
the Attorney General was directed to transfer the substance from Schedule II
to Schedule I first, and thirty days thereafter the Secretary (FDA)
is
directed to withdraw the NDA. See Appendix.
Clearly, Congress was exercising its prerogative, which only it possesses, to
enact legislation. DEA and FDA must operate within the procedural scheme
established for them by the Congress, but Congress is not so constrained.
Congress, as it has the power to do, directed DEA to outlaw methaqualone
regardless of the fact that it had an accepted medical use and regardless
of the fact that the NDA had not yet been withdrawn by FDA.
Conclusion
The administrative law judge concludes that "accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States" is not determined by NDA approvals or dis-
approvals by FDA. It is determined, rather, by what is actually going on
within the health care community.
The administrative law judge finds and concludes that there is no "lack of
accepted safety for use" of MDMA "under medical supervision." On the
contrary, there is accepted safety for use.
In the above listing, substance I is mescaline, substance IV is MDA and VIII
is MDMA. From columns "4" and "3" we see that substances III, IV (MDA), V and
VIII (MDMA) all have the methylenedioxy group added to amphetamine. Yet
substances III and V are not scheduled drugs. DEA has not found them to have
significant abuse potential, despite their close structural similarity to MDA
and MDMA.
13. Chemical similarity may or may not be a good guide to the actual effects
of a compound in the human body.
14. MDMA produces pharmacological effects in common with both central
nervous system stimulants like amphetamine, and hallucinogens like MDA, in
animals.
15. MDA and MDMA both produce central nervous system stimulation in animals
as measured by increased locomotor activity in mice.
16. Tests conducted by Braun, Shulgin and Braun show that at an oral dose of
20mg. /kg. in mice, MDA produced a significant increase in locomotor
activity. At the same dose, MDMA produced approximately three times the
motor activity of MDA during the first three hours after application. They
concluded that MDA, MDMA and N-ethyl MDA caused the greatest stimulation and
that this is consistent with results of tests in mice of amphetamine
compounds with no ring substitution (e.g. amphetamine and methamphetamine).
Braun, Shulgin and Braun further conclude that "compounds which cause a sharp
increase in motor activity in animals generally prove to have a pronounced
central nervous system effect on man.
17. A study conducted by Intox Laboratories reported significantly reduced
body weights at 7 and 14 days following initiation of MDMA dosing in rats.
18. The Intox Laboratory study also reported that rats who had been
administered MDMA showed hyperactivity, excitability, aggressive behavior and
stereotypic behavior.
19. Studies conducted by Dr. Harris at the Medical College of Virginia
compared the locomotor activity in mice using d-amphetamine and MDMA. Dr.
Harris found that MDMA produces slightly less central nervous system
stimulation than amphetamine at peak activity which is 1 1/2 hours after
administration. However, at 5-15 minutes and 2-3 hours after administration,
the maximum stimulating effect of MDMA is substantially greater than that
produced by d-amphetamine.
20. MDA and MDMA produce similar centrally mediated analgesic effects in
mice as determined by the hot-plate test, the tail-flick test and the stretch
test. The tail-flick test and hot plate tests showed that MDMA produces an
increased analgesic effect over that produced by MDA.
21. MDA and MDMA both produce an increase in body temperature when
administered to rabbits at similar potencies. Hyperthermia in rabbits is
reported to be a measure of central nervous system activity. Dr. Shulgin
notes that there is a reasonably good parallel between the hyperthermia
response in rabbits and same of the effects of LSD, and that these parallel
quite closely the psychopharmacological potency in humans. He feels that it
is probably the best animal test at present for estimating psychotomimetic
potency.
22. The preceding eight findings demonstrate that it is appropriate to
classify MDMA as a central nervous system (CNS) stimulant. Although MDMA may
be so classified, there are many other substances which are CNS stimulants
but which are not currently controlled in the United States nor have been
recommended for control by WHO. Caffeine is one such substance. Others,
whose abuse potential has been reviewed by WHO, are clobenzorex,
fenbutrazate, furfenorex, morazone, para-oxyamphetamine, and N, N-
dimethylamphetamine.
23. Categorizing a substance as a CNS stimulant is of little assistance in
determining whether or not it has a potential for abuse or what relative
degree of abuse potential it may have.
24. Both MDA and MDMA are potent releasers of serotonin or 5-
hydroxytryptamine, a neurotransmitter which has a widely accepted role in the
activity of hallucinogens.
25. Two substances classified by HHS as hallucinogens have not been
scheduled in the United States nor have they been recommended by WHO, after
review, for scheduling. They are 4-bromo-2, 5-dimethoxyphenethylamine and N-
ethyl-3, 4-methylenedioxyamphetamine. Thus, categorizing a substance as a
hallucinogen is of little assistance in determining whether or not that
substance has a potential for abuse or what relative degree of abuse
potential it may have.
26. In mice, dogs and monkeys, MDA and MDMA produce the same spectrum of
pharmacological effects when observed during toxicity studies. These effects
include hyperactivity, excitability, emesis, apprehension or fright,
aggressive behavior, bizarre body attitudes, apparent hallucinations, dyspnea
and hyperpnea. Motor activity effects include convulsions, muscular rigidity
and tremors and the autonomic activity includes mydriasis, piloerection,
salivation and vascular flushing. These effects are part of what is
described as the classical pharmacological response of the dog to intravenous
mescaline.
27. The lethality of a compound is reported as an LD50, which is the dose of
a drug which will kill 50% of the animals receiving that dose.
28. The LD50's for mescaline, MDA and MDMA were determined by intravenous
[15] or intraperitoneal
[16] administration in five species of
animals. MDMA
had LD50's between 2 and 6 times less than those of mescaline and between 1.5
and 3 times more than MDA. This means that MDMA is more lethal than
mescaline but less lethal than MDA.
29. Intraperitoneal LD50's for MDA and MDMA were determined in mice by
Davis. The LD50's of MDMA and MDA were substantially the same with the LD50
for MDA equaling 90.0 mg./kg. and the LD50 for MDMA equaling 106.5 mg./kg.
Dr. Hardman found the LD50 of MDA to be 92 mg./kg. Davis also found that
both MDA and MDMA showed the amphetamine-like property of increased lethality
under aggregated housing conditions compared to isolated housing conditions.
30. In the study conducted by Intox Laboratories the oral LD50 for MDMA in
rats was estimated to be approximately 325 mg./kg. No oral value was
reported for MDA but based on the data from Intox Laboratories, Dr. Hardman
estimated it to be approximately 150 mg./kg.
31. Every drug has an LD50. The preceding four findings as to LD50 have
nothing to do with establishing the abuse potential of MDMA. A value that is
of interest, however, is the therapeutic index, i.e., the ratio of the LD50
to the effective dose (ED50). How close is the dose which will kill 50% of
the tested animals to the dose required for the desired effect in humans? If
these two doses are very close to each other, then there is an obvious danger
in using the drug with humans.
32. Most general anesthetics have a very low therapeutic index of two to
one, i.e., just twice the quantity commonly used in medical practice is
sufficient to kill. Yet these anesthetics are used by doctors all the time,
under carefully controlled conditions.
33. The estimated oral LD50 for MDMA in rats, as noted above, is 325
mg./kg., i.e., 325 mg. of MDMA per kilogram of weight of the rat. The
effective oral human dose is 2 mg./kg. of weight. Thus there appears to be a
comparatively large margin of safety in the use of MDMA in humans - the LD50
is 160 times the ED50 in humans.
34. MDMA, MDA, amphetamine and methamphetamine produce effects that are
neurotoxic, i.e., nerve destructive, when administered to animals. MDMA and
MDA are neurotoxic in rats at doses which are very low compared to the
neurotoxic doses of amphetamine and methamphetamine.
35. MDMA and MDA both produce long term reduction in serotonin levels and
uptake sites in the rat brain. These neurochemical depletions are due to the
destruction of serotonin nerve terminals as determined by visual staining
techniques.
36. In humans, serotonin nerve terminals are believed to play a major role
in mood, emotion, pain perception, sleep and affect the regulation of
aggressive and sexual behavior.
37. Although single injections of MDMA may be slightly less neurotoxic than
MDA, chronic use of MDMA appears to be more neurotoxic than MDA. The
relevance and materiality of this conclusion to the report of the study on
which this conclusion was based indicates only that the MDMA was injected
into rats. The route of injection, which will make a vast difference in the
meaning of the results noted, is not given in the report. Humans are known
to take MDMA orally, not by injection. This difference is of great
importance, and renders the test results meaningless for our purpose.
38. The neurotoxicity of amphetamine and methamphetamine has been determined
in rats, guinea pigs and monkeys.
39. MDMA and MDA are suspected of having the potential to produce the same
neurotoxic effects to serotonergic nerves in humans, but there is very little
evidence to support this suspicion.
40. On the other hand, the drug fenfluramine has been determined to produce
the biochemical effects in rats of which MDMA is suspected, but at much lower
dosage levels than in the case of MDMA. In fact, the proven dosage levels of
fenfluramine causing these effects are merely 1.25 times its ED50 when used
for anorexia in humans. Nonetheless, FDA has approved the daily use of
fenfluramine in humans on a chronic basis. Fenfluramine is a controlled
substance, but this proven neurotoxic substance is only in Schedule IV.
41. Drug discrimination studies in animals allow one to determine if a
particular dose of a test substance produces in the animal effects which are
recognized by the animal as the same as those produced by a particular dose
of another substance. It is believed that the effects recognized by the
animals in these studies are central nervous system effects and hence this
paradigm is very useful in characterizing centrally acting compounds.
42. In drug discrimination paradigms, complete generalization indicates that
the test compound is similar enough for the animal to recognize it as the
training drug by responding on the appropriate drug lever at least 80% of the
time. No generalization indicates that the test compound is unlike the
training compound so that a low number of responses will be made on the drug
lever. Partial generalization indicates that there may be pharmacological
effects common to both test and training drug, but that some doses of the
test and training drug are similar and at the tested doses another type of
pharmacological effect may predominate.
43. MDMA shares discriminative stimulus properties in common with
amphetamine and MDA in drug discrimination studies in rats.
44. In a drug discrimination test described by Dr. Glennon, rats trained to
recognize amphetamine also recognized MDA and MDMA. MDMA was slightly more
potent than MDA in being recognized as amphetamine. Other compounds which
generalized to the amphetamine stimulus included methamphetamine, cocaine and
para-methoxyamphetamine.
45. Rats trained to recognize MDA recognized MDMA, in drug discrimination
studies conducted by Dr. Glennon, as having some properties similar to MDA.
46. MDA completely generalized (83% correct response) in rats trained to
recognize 4-methyl-2, 5-dimethoxyamphetamine (DOM), a substance with known
hallucinogenic properties, but only within a very narrow dosage range.
47. MDA is unique among chemicals in being recognized by animals who are
trained to recognize hallucinogens and also by animals trained to recognize
stimulants. MDMA does not share this dual response characteristic of MDA.
The overwhelming weight of the evidence in this record is that MDMA is not
properly classified as a hallucinogen. One witness disagrees. His
disagreement results from reports he has received from street users, who are
widely regarded as an unreliable source of information as to specifics on any
matter. There are no results of controlled scientific experiments in the
record establishing MDMA to be a hallucinogen in humans. Animals trained to
recognize MDA who also respond to MDMA are, more likely than not, responding
to the CNS stimulant characteristic of MDMA rather than to any hallucinogenic
properties.
48. The significance of animal discrimination test findings as to abuse
potential in humans is far from certain. An Agency witness in this
proceeding co-authored an article, published in 1984, which states that
unless a particular compound has been tested in humans, one cannot be certain
that structure-activity relationships will apply in the clinical situation,
i.e., when used in humans. He cautioned that the most common error found in
animal models is the identification of "false positives". That is, the
animal models may indicate a compound to be active, whereas actual testing in
humans reveals inactivity. The article also says that it is clear that no
present animal models correlate with the qualitative differences between
hallucinogens observed in humans.
49. In 1984 the National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) reviewed DEA's
initial proposal for the placing of MDMA in Schedule I. NIDA reported to Dr.
Edward Tocus of the FDA that: " The direct evidence that MDMA has any abuse
potential in animals is not substantiated, based on the data DEA provided."
GG 55.[17]
50. A standard abuse liability test for assessing the reinforcing properties
of a drug is the substitution procedure. It is the most common and reliable
method for determining whether a drug will be self-administered. In this
procedure new drugs are tested to determine whether or not they will maintain
the responding of animals trained to lever press for intravenous delivery of
a known drug reinforcer.
51. As our hearings were concluding it was learned that tests were being
conducted with rhesus monkeys and baboons trained to self-administer cocaine
to see if the monkeys and baboons would continue to self-administer when MDMA
was substituted for the cocaine. Preliminary reports were obtained from
those conducting these tests. These reports were placed in evidence by the
Agency. Upon study of them, and of the Response to them dated November 4,
1985 by Drs. Grinspoon, et al., the administrative law judge finds that
these preliminary reports lack sufficient indicia of reliability to be
given any weight. They certainly fail to buttress the Agency's position that
MDMA has "a high potential for abuse" in humans. They are immaterial.
52. Drs. Shulgin and Nichols first reported that MDMA produces
psychotomimetic effects in man in 1976. These effects are described as
intoxication, an easily controlled altered state of consciousness and
sympathomimetic stimulation.
53. The racemic mixture of MDMA, which is a combination of both optical
isomers, is the drug which is clandestinely produced, found in the illicit
traffic and used by psychiatrists.
54. In a 1978 publication, Dr. Shulgin reported that racemic MDMA produced a
high level of intoxication in man at doses of 100-160mg. Color enhancement as
well physical symptoms of mydriasis and jaw clenching were noted. MDMA was
described as maintaining the same potency as MDA but exhibiting subtle
differences in the qualitative nature of the intoxication.
55. In a 1980 publication, Dr. Shulgin and others describe MDA and MDMA as
having both stimulant and psychotomimetic properties in humans. Racemic MDA
and MDMA were administered orally to five volunteers at doses up to 160mg.
The effective dose of MDA was 60-120mg., while that of MDMA was 100-160mg.
Dr. Shulgin and others noted a drive increasing effect, a change in
expression and an apparent increase in the acoustic, visual and tactile
sensory perceptions as well as a tension-decreasing, mood-lightening effect
in the human subjects. A slight mydriasis and sympathomimetic stimulation
were noted during the entire period. me effects of MDA and MDMA were apparent
beginning 30 minutes after ingestion and continuing for approximately four
hours, except that a slight increase in motor activity lasted several more
hours. Shulgin concluded that the "psychopharmacological profiles" of MDA and
MDMA and two other compounds are very similar. However, five years later
Shulgin wrote: "There can be little validity in an argument that the
psychopharmacology of MDMA can be predicted from that of MDA. The facts are
otherwise." GG 30, p.3.
56. There are observed differences in humans between the effects of MDA and
MDMA. Studies other than the one reported by Shulgin in 1980 have shown MDA
to have duration of action in humans of 12 to 15 hours, as compared to four
to six hours for MDMA. MDA has been found to produce a mild cognitive
impairment in humans at the 75mg. dosage level, while MDMA did not impair
cognition even at 200mg. As MDA dosages increase from 75 to 200mg., the
effects in humans become increasingly similar to the effects of LSD,
including the presence of visions. As dosages of MDMA increase from 75 to
200mg., the intensity of the sense of wellbeing and inner flow of
associations which characterize the experience increase only moderately while
the ego functions remain intact, cognition is unimpaired and visions are
notably absent. Large doses of MDA (200mg) produce significantly greater
disorientation and an up-welling of visual images that are not characteristic
of MDMA in similar dose range.
57. The dosage comparisons just referred to are those using the levo-rotary
optical isomer of MDA. There are clear indications that this isomer of MDA
is more active than either the racemic mixture or the dextro-rotary isomer.
It was the racemic mixture of MDMA that was used in the studies referred to
immediately above.
58. The uncontradicted evidence of record is that there are qualitative
differences in humans between MDA and MDMA.
59. The Agency presented testimony from a staff member of only one of the
many drug abuse clinics in the country, the Haight-Ashbury Free Medical
Clinic in San Francisco. This clinic treats approximately three to four
clients per month who seek help for problems arising from the use of one or
more of a group of five or six different drugs which the clinic lumps
together in its statistics. MDMA is one of these drugs. The clinic has no
reliable figures on how many of these three to four patients per month have
been reporting abuse of MDMA specifically. Even if the three or four clients
mentioned all reported using MDMA, that would constitute less than one
percent of the clinic's total of about 450 clients per month. The clinic has
no way of knowing whether any of its relatively small number of clients
reporting MDMA use were actually using MDMA -no reliable testing has been
done. Many of the drugs sold on the street to persons such as the clients of
this clinic are not, in fact, what they are represented to be by the seller.
The numbers, three to four clients per month reporting use of MDMA or any one
of the other drugs lumped together with it statistically by this clinic, has
remained fairly constant for the last 15 years. In that 15 year period there
has been only one instance of a client reporting use of MDMA and producing a
pill of the type he said he had been taking which was analyzed and was
reliably reported to be MDMA. Two other pills, brought in by other clients
reporting them to be samples of MDMA, turned out to be not MDMA but, rather,
MDA.
60. During the year preceding April 24, 1985 there were no reported
incidents of abuse of MDMA, or of complications resulting from its use, in
the Philadelphia, PA, area. No such instances in New York City or in Boston
during that period were brought to the attention of a staff psychiatrist at a
Veterans Administration Hospital drug abuse clinic in Philadelphia who has
talked with colleagues in those cities.
61. In the Los Angeles area there was a noticeable increase in the street
use of MDMA shortly before its becoming illegal on July 1, 1985. This
coincided with the attention MDMA received in the news media at that time.
There was also a significant increase in the manufacture of MDMA at that
time, much of which was to permit stockpiling of supplies before the July 1,
1985 ban went into effect. This manufacturing was done by those who supplied
the street market. It has been estimated that in all of 1976, 10,000 doses
of MDMA were distributed in the United States for street use, as opposed to
30,000 doses per month in 1985. These estimates are based on information
obtained from street users. Street users are notoriously unreliable in
matters of specific information. No reliable conclusion as to number of users
can be gleaned from these estimated figures. In 1985 the most common patterns
of nonmedical use of MDMA found in Los Angeles were "experimental" (ten times
or less in lifetime history) or "social-recreational" (one to four times per
month).
62. Cocaine poses many more, and much more serious, social problems for this
country than did MDMA before it was banned. Street drug users in Los Angeles
did not find it as appealing as cocaine. Cocaine is very rewarding and
produces pleasurable sensations in the brain that causes the brain to try to
repeat the experience. Cocaine has the potential for producing a lot of
repetitive drug taking. It produces tolerance and, in an effort to overcome
the tolerance, people repeat the experience again and again. Substances
considered to be similar to MDMA in their effects on humans have not been
used in that way, according to studies of drug users made over the last 20 to
30 years.
63. The circumstances and surroundings in which MDMA is taken, or in which
one who has recently ingested MDMA finds himself, has an effect on the
reactions and perceptions of the subject while the drug is still effective
within his system.
64. Low to moderate doses of MDMA have been given to individuals by wholly
legitimate and highly regarded psychiatrists as an adjunct to psychotherapy.
Some of the MDMA so administered was made by them under the super vision of
Dr. Shulgin in his laboratory in California.
65. MDMA has been reported, by the psychiatrists administering it to
themselves and others, and by other individuals, to produce at one time or
another some or all of the following physical effects: jaw clenching,
anorexia, insomnia, flight of ideas, increased heart and pulse rate,
mydriasis, nystagmus, blurred vision, enhanced deep tendon reflexes, fatigue
after use, ataxia, nausea, vomiting, headache and shakiness.
66. Psychological effects reported for low to moderate doses of MDMA, in
various subjects at various times, include gentle euphoria, sense of well-
being and peacefulness, increases in physical and emotional energy, focus on
the here and now, impaired judgment, heightened sensual awareness, anxiety,
brief short term memory loss, distortion in depth perception, brief
hallucination, visual illusion, nervousness, mild depression, mental fatigue,
confusion and altered state of consciousness.
67. MDMA was first identified by a DEA laboratory in 1972. Between 1972 and
April 1985, DEA laboratories had identified 41 exhibits of MDMA consisting of
over 60,000 dosage units.
68. Since its temporary placement into Schedule I on July 1, 1985, MDMA has
been identified in at least 14 exhibits submitted to DEA laboratories from
Texas alone. These 14 exhibits contained over 35,000 dosage units of MDMA.
69. MDMA is available in tablets, capsules and powders with recent analyses
indicating approximately 11Omg. of racemic MDMA per dosage unit. MDMA has
been encountered in many sections of the United States and other countries.
70. Since 1978, nonfederal forensic laboratories have reported at least 41
exhibits of MDMA to DEA.
71. Pharm Chem Laboratories and Toxicology Testing Service are laboratories
which provide confidential analysis of drug samples voluntarily submitted to
them. Their data provides some useful information on the availability of
street drugs and trends in drug abuse patterns.
72. Between 1973 and 1983, Pharm Chem Laboratories reported MDA and MDMA in
the same category. The total number of submissions of MDA/MDMA between 1973
and 1983 was 610, ranging from 21 in 1974 to 88 in 1978. This evidence is of
little help to us since we are not told how many of the 610 total submissions
were MDA and how many were MDMA. It is worth noting that the highest number
of combined MDA/MDMA submissions to Pharm Chem was 88 in 1978. Only 22 such
submissions were reported in 1983.
73. Pharm Chem reported 20 submissions of MDMA between May 1983 and May 1984
when it discontinued its testing service.
74. Toxicology Testing Service reported 15 submissions of MDMA between April
1, 1984 and March 31, 1985.
75. In its investigation of the clandestine manufacture of controlled
substances, DEA has seized four clandestine laboratories producing, or
possessing the necessary chemicals to produce, MDMA during the 13 year period
1972 through 1984. A total of about 2,400 clandestine laboratories were
seized during that period. During the seven year period 1977 through 1983,
31 clandestine laboratories having the capacity to produce MDA were seized.
Impurities found in the MDMA analyzed by forensic laboratories indicate that
MDMA is produced in clandestine laboratories.
76. A DEA investigation conducted in June 1984, of a suspected cocaine
distributor produced information that a drug known as "Ecstasy" was being
sold in the Dallas, Texas area. Samples were obtained through undercover
buys in that area in February and March 1985. Analysis revealed each tablet
to contain 110mg. of MDMA. In April 1985 "Ecstasy" was widely available on
the street in the Dallas area. It was reported to DEA agents in March 1985
that "Ecstasy" was being shipped to the Dallas area in cases containing 100
tablet bottles from California. It was at that time being marketed in the
Dallas area in a manner similar to that in which structured illicit drug
trafficking organizations operate. At that time it was not illegal to
manufacture, sell or possess MDMA under the Federal CSA. The record is
unclear as to whether or not these actions were illegal under Texas State law
at that time.
77. Street prices for MDMA in 1984 were listed as $70 per gram in New York
and $20 per capsule in New Hampshire in an underground flier.
78. Students at the University of Texas at Austin indicate that MDMA is
easily available on campus at about $5 to $20 a tablet.
79. Dr. Richard P. Ingrasci has interviewed over 500 individuals who have
used MDMA over the past seven to eight years. A little more than half of
these individuals had used MDMA in a non-therapeutically motivated setting,
out of curiosity or for recreation.
80. Dr. Joseph J. Downing, a practicing psychiatrist in San Francisco, CA,
conducted a pilot study in 1984 into the effects in healthy humans of a
single exposure to MDMA. The 21 subjects in Dr. DowningÕs MDMA study had all
used MDMA previously. One had used MDMA 15 times, one 10 times, and one only
once. The mean frequency of use of the 21 subjects was once every 2.2
months.
81. Dr. Lester Grinspoon reports that MDMA is being taken by a growing
number of people, particularly students and young professionals. The text
cited by Government counsel does not indicate to what extent this use is in a
therapeutic setting or is in a casual or recreational manner.
82. Dr. George Greer, a practicing psychiatrist in Santa Fe, New Mexico, has
used MDMA as an adjunct to psychotherapy in clinical work. He reported that
one of his subjects, after taking the unusually high dosage of 350mg. of
MDMA, reported a brief hallucination, a brief visual illusion, a mild hearing
impairment, a brief memory loss and a brief distortion in depth perception.
83. The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) publishes annually a
compilation of drug abuse information collected through its Drug Abuse
Warning Network (DAWN). This data collection system collects reports from
selected (currently more than 700) hospital emergency rooms in the United
States. The reports collected record all visits to those emergency rooms for
medical problems associated with drug abuse. According to NIDA, the major
objectives of the DAWN system include the following:
To monitor drug abuse patterns and trends and to detect new abuse entities
and new combinations;
To assess health hazards associated with drug abuse.
84. The record reflects that from 1972 through September 15, 1983, there
were only eight mentions of MDMA in the DAWN system. During the period 1972
through 1983, the DAWN system was reporting approximately 175,000 drug
mentions each year. Thus, the eight mentions of MDMA occurred during a
period during which DAWN reported roughly 2 million mentions of other drugs.
The few mentions here of MDMA are far less than those of such Schedule I
drugs as heroin, marijuana, and LSD. During the time period that MDMA was
mentioned 8 times, MDA, a Schedule I drug, was mentioned 344 times -- more
than 40 times as frequently. MDMA does not compare with the frequency with
which Schedule II drugs appear in the DAWN reports, nor even with the
mentions of Schedule III drugs or Schedule IV drugs found there. The FDA of
the Department of HHS called the eight DAWN mentions of MDMA "not significant
except to indicate the existence of human use of MDMA."
85. MDMA is reported to have been associated with two overdose deaths. One
death occurred in Seattle, Washington in 1979. However, the evidence in the
record does not permit a finding that MDMA was, in fact, involved in that
death. A careful reading of the toxicology report shows that the involvement
of MDMA there is questionable. The second reported association, in Santa
Monica, California, is even more questionable. There is no toxicology report
at all in this record with regard to it. The evidence does not permit a
finding that MDMA was, in fact, associated with that death, either.
86. The record of the FDA-HHS consideration of MDMA is as follows.
87. The relevant staff member at FDA, Dr. Edward Tocus, reviewed the DEA
Control Recommendation proposing that MDMA be placed in Schedule I (G B-2).
He subsequently prepared a one-and-one-half page document which included both
a summary and an evaluation of the Recommendation.
88. Dr. Greer, practicing psychiatrist in New Mexico, had previously written
to the Assistant Secretary for Health about Dr. GreerÕs therapeutic work with
MDMA. Dr. Greer had also written to an FDA staff member (Mr. Contrera), a
supervising pharmacologist who worked for Dr. Tocus, about Dr. GreerÕs work
with MDMA, enclosing a copy of his report of his work with MDMA (GG 14). Dr.
Tocus was not aware of these prior contacts between Dr. Greer and the FDA
when Dr. Tocus wrote is MDMA control evaluation and prepared related papers
for his superiors at HHS.
89. At the time Dr. Tocus review the DEA recommendation and prepared the HHS
document for his superiors, he believed that the statutory phrase "accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States" meant that a drug had to have
been approved by the FDA for interstate shipment and sale pursuant to the
FDCA. Further, Dr. Tocus believed that, based on his understanding of the
law, if HHS came to the conclusion that a drug should be scheduled but it had
not been approved for interstate shipment and sale, pursuant to the FDCA,
"that the only alternatives were Schedule I [if it had any abuse potential]
or no schedule at all." (Tr 9, at 67)
90. Before formulating its recommendations on MDMA, the FDA and HHS did not
consult any organization of medical professionals. Dr. Tocus testified that
he did not take any action to make inquiries about medical opinion on MDMA
even though he had been told on a hearsay basis that there was some
therapeutic interest in the drug. The Department of HHS did not refer the
issue of the appropriate scheduling of MDMA to the FDA's Drug Abuse Advisory
Committee. This Committee is made up of authorities knowledgeable in the
medical, behavioral and biological sciences as they apply to drug abuse. Its
Charter, signed by the Secretary of HHS, states:
The Committee advises the Commissioner of Food and Drugs regarding the
scientific and medical evaluation of all information gathered by the
Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Justice with
regard to safety, efficacy, and abuse potential of drugs or other substances
and recommends actions to be taken by the Department of Health and Human
Services with regard to marketing, investigations, and control of such drugs
or other substances.
GC 62 (emphasis added). No one at FDA had the benefit of any input from this
Committee with respect to MDMA.
91. Dr. Tocus made six typographical corrections to the original DEA
recommendation for Schedule I placement of MDMA. These corrections are set
out in GG 59. Dr. Tocus then prepared his one-and-one-half page summary and
analysis or evaluation of the DEA scheduling recommendation. (G B-4)
92. The recommendation Dr. Tocus prepared for his superiors does not mention
that Dr. Tocus had been informed orally that there was therapeutic interest
in MDMA, or that Dr. Greer had previously communicated his interest in MDMA,
and the actual usage of it in therapy, to the Assistant Secretary for Health
and to the FDA.
93. The recommendation prepared by Dr. Tocus for his superior never
discusses of comments on "accepted medical use in treatment" or "accepted
safety for use under medical supervision." It includes a single sentence
asserting that: "There is no known legitimate use of MDMA in humans." (G B-4
at 2) This key statement was inaccurate.
94. Dr. Tocus testified that he forwarded his one-and-one-half page
evaluation (G B-4) and the DEAÕs evaluation (GC 56) to the Acting
Commissioner of FDA and thence to the Assistant Secretary for Health.
95. Before forwarding the papers Dr. Tocus requested comments on the DEA
proposal to schedule MDMA in Schedule I from the National Institute on Drug
Abuse (NIDA) -- as he was required to do by HHS departmental procedures. The
National Institute on Drug Abuse responded in memorandum form. GG 55. The
NIDA memorandum states that: "The direct evidence that MDMA has any abuse
potential is animals is not substantiated, based on the data DEA provided."
That memorandum, noting that there have been some reports of MDMA use outside
the medical context, concluded that "NIDA does not have any objection to
placing MDMA under schedule I of the CSA." But NIDA reaches no conclusion
that MDMA has a "high" potential for abuse. The NIDA memorandum give no
indication of an opinion as the any level of potential for abuse.
96. The NIDA memorandum was not forwarded to the Commissioner of the FDA
and was not forwarded to the Assistant Secretary for Health. Dr. Tocus
was
aware of the view of NIDA prior to receiving the NIDA memorandum. He shared
the NIDA view that the evidence did not substantiate abuse potential in
animals. But those judgments were not reflected in the materials that Dr.
Tocus forwarded to the Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs or to the
Assistant Secretary for Health.
97. None of the underlying documents prepared at the Department of HHS ever
reached the conclusion that MDMA had a "high" potential for abuse. The one-
and-one-half page memorandum prepared by Dr. Tocus notes on page one that
DEA has concluded that MDMA has a high potential for abuse. But the HHS
evaluation itself never so concludes.
98. Based on this record, the Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs forwarded
the package on to the Assistant Secretary of Health. The Acting Commissioner
stated his conclusion to be only that "MDMA has a significant potential for
abuse." (GG 54) He made no mention of "a high potential for abuse," which is
what the CSA requires for Schedule I or Schedule II placement.
99. The formal response to DEA from HHS, signed by the Assistant Secretary
for Health, does state that: "We believe MDMA has a high potential for abuse"
and recommends Schedule I placement. (G B-3) This difference as to degree of
abuse potential between "significant" and "high" represents a quantum
increase from the memorandum of the Acting Commissioner to the letter of the
Assistant Secretary for which there is no basis in the record of HHS'
consideration.
100. DEA was unaware of the therapeutic use to which MDMA had been put by Dr.
Greer and other doctors when it prepared its initial recommendation for
placing MDMA in Schedule I (G B-2) and sent it to HHS.
Discussion
The Agency staff has the burden here of establishing that MDMA has a "high"
potential for abuse. It has not carried that burden. A "high" potential is
required by the CSA for placement in either Schedule I or Schedule II.
The evidence as to the meaning of similarity of chemical structure between
MDMA and other substances is inconclusive. There is similarity, for example,
between MDMA and MDA, which is a CSA Schedule I substance. But there is
comparable similarity between these two drugs and two others which have not
been found to have any abuse potential and which are not scheduled at all.
See finding 12, page 42. MDMA is classified as a phenethylamine. Some
phenethylamines are scheduled under the CSA, but others are not. WHO has
reviewed the abuse potential of 28 phenethylamines. It has recommended only
some of those 28 for scheduling. Of those 28, there are eight which have
neither been scheduled at all in the United States nor recommended for
scheduling by WHO. See finding 11, page 41.
The great preponderance of the evidence in this record is to the effect that
MDMA is not properly classified as a hallucinogen. There is some expression
of opinion to the contrary. Even if it is classified as such, that fact would
not establish a "high" potential for abuse in humans. There are at least two
known hallucinogens which have not been scheduled at all in the United
States. See finding 25, pages 44 and 45.
Animal tests have shown MDMA to be a central nervous system stimulant. MDA, a
Schedule I substance, is a central nervous stimulant. But that fact does not
establish that MDMA should also be placed in Schedule I. Many other
substances also act as central nervous stimulants which are not scheduled at
all. See finding 22, page 44.
The other animal test results in the record are equally inconclusive as to
abuse potential. See findings 37, 40, and 47, above.
There are reports of non-medical use of MDMA by humans. These reports do
establish that MDMA has a potential for abuse. But before it can be said
that, in the context of $ 812, MDMA has a "high" potential for abuse, the
known facts as to MDMA must be compared with the known facts as to human
abuse of other substances. When these comparisons are made, it cannot be
concluded that the facts show MDMA to have a "high" potential for abuse. See
findings 59, 62, 72, and 84, above.
Upon close examination the material received from HHS is of little assistance
to us in this case. No independent tests, studies or scientific examinations
were made there. Relevant and material facts and opinions, within the
knowledge of some at FDA, were not brought to the attention of higher
officials, including the Assistant Secretary who signed the formal
communication to the Administrator of DEA.
The staff person at FDA responsible in this matter had a misunderstanding of
the law's requirements from the outset. He was of the misapprehension that a
substance with any degree of potential for abuse had to be placed
in
Schedule I if it lacked an IND, or NDA, granted by FDA.
FDA did not see fit to consult its panel of experts created for the purpose,
the Drug Abuse Advisory Committee. That group would undoubtedly have had
helpful input for our consideration of the "acceptable medical use" issue,
and the "degree of abuse potential" issue, among others.
There are no "binding" recommendations in the HHS letter of June 6, 1984 (G
B-3) and its enclosure (G B-4) such as are contemplated by 21 U.S.C. $
811(b). The only recommendation stated is as to the schedule into which MDMA
should be put. This is, of course, the ultimate question to be determined
and the Secretary's recommendation on it, though entitled to consideration,
is not made "binding" by the statute. For the rest, the response from HHS
contains same factual recitals, largely repeating or summarizing the data
initially sent to it by DEA, and some expressions of opinion - interesting in
that they do not give much support to the one recommendation made. For
instance, FDA observes on page 2 of G B-4 that the rate of MDMA mentions in
the DAWN reports "is not significant except to indicate the existence of
human use of MDMA." It is also there observed that the difference in numbers
of DAWN mentions between MDMA and MDA "is considered to be more an indication
of availability rather than degree of toxicity." The observation that "there
is no known legitimate use of MDMA in humans" is incorrect as a factual
statement. If it is intended to reflect an interpretation of the statute, it
is entitled to consideration, which it has received, supra, but it is
certainly not binding.
These critical observations are, regrettably, essential if we are to put the
formal recommendation of the Assistant Secretary into proper focus and
determine the weight of which it is deserving. In the circumstances, it
appears to be deserving of very little weight.
Conclusion
The evidence of record does not establish that, in the context of $ 812, MDMA
has a "high potential for abuse." Accordingly, it cannot be placed in
Schedule II. (We have already seen that it cannot be placed in Schedule I,
because it does have "a currently accepted medical use in treatment" and it
does not "lack . . . accepted safety for use . . . under medical
supervision.")
No one has argued here that the evidence establishes that MDMA "may lead to
severe psychological or physical dependence," another requirement for
Schedule II placement. The evidence does not so establish. For this reason,
also, MDMA cannot be placed in Schedule II.
Mr. Ehrnstein argues that MDMA cannot be scheduled at all because HHS has not
performed such a scientific and medical evaluation as the CSA calls for. He
asserts that this failure deprives DEA of "jurisdiction" to schedule the
drug. The administrative law judge rejects this argument. The statute
requires DEA to "request" an evaluation from HHS. DEA did so. HHS did send a
recommendation to DEA. DEA is considering that recommendation. The minimum
statutory requirements have been met in this case.
Mr. Ehrnstein also argues that the evidence establishes no abuse potential
sufficient to place MDMA in any of the five schedules. Ihe administrative law
judge agrees, and accepts this argument, as to Schedule II. The judge
disagrees with, and rejects, the remainder of the argument. There is ample
evidence of some abuse potential in the record.
Drs. Grinspoon, et al., argue that sufficient evidence of abuse potential
has been shown to warrant placing of MDMA in Schedule III. The administrative
law judge agrees, concluding that the evidence does establish MDMA to have
"potential for abuse less than the drugs or other substances in Schedules I
and II," and to establish that abuse of MDMA "may lead to moderate or low
physical dependence or high psychological dependence." 21 U.S.C. $ 812(b)(3).
The administrative law judge concludes that the evidence of record requires
MDMA to be placed in Schedule III.
[1] P.L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242, 21
U.S.C. $$ 801, et seq. [2] 21 U.S.C. $ 811(a). [3] 28 C.F.R. $ 0.100. [4] 49 F.R. 30210 (1984). [5] The participants are the Agency
staff (DEA or the Agency); George Greer,
M.D., Lester Grinspoon, M.D., Thomas B. Roberts, Ph.D. and James Bakalar
(Greer-Grinspoon); McNeilab, Inc. and Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. (McNeilab); Lyn
B. Ehrnstein, Esq., (Ehrnstein); and David E. Joranson (Joranson). See
Memorandum to Counsel dated March 22, 1985. [6] There are ten volumes of
transcript. The first contains the preliminary
session on February 1, 1985. The remainder contain the testimony on cross
examination and the oral argument. They have been numbered 1 through 10, and
are cited herein as follows:
February 1, 1985 -- Tr 1; June 10, 1985 -- Tr 2; July 10, 1985 -- Tr 3; July
11, 1985 -- Tr 4; October 8, 1985 -- Tr 5; October 9, 1985 -- Tr 6; October
11, 1985 -- Tr 7; October 11, 1985 -- Tr 8; November 1, 1985 -- Tr 9;
February 14, 1986 -- Tr 10 [7] The Secretary's input into the
matter comes to the Administrator from the
Assistant Secretary of Health, HHS. [8] Under the FDCA, the labeling of any
prescription drug, whether subject to
approval or not, must be adequate for the drug's intended purposes. In the
case of prescription drugs (as opposed to "over-the-counter" drugs available
without a prescription), the requirements are met by conditioning avail
ability on a practitioner's prescription, and on there being labeling
directions for physicians and pharmacists (as opposed to laymen) as to the
prescribing, dispensing, and administration of the drug. 21 C.F.R. $
201.100. [9] Quoted immediately above. [10] Government's Response To The
Findings, etc., Submitted by Drs. Greer and
Grinspoon, et al., etc., p. 13. [11] In their Reply Brief, at page 16,
Agency counsel quote a sentence from a
written statement submitted to the Congress on another occasion by Director
Ingersoll in justification of the Schedule I placement of a particular
substance. This one, isolated sentence appears directly to contradict Mr.
Ingersoll's oral testimony to the Committee quoted above. To that extent it
is inconsistent also with the quoted oral statements of Mr. Sonnenreich, Mr.
Ingersoll's deputy chief counsel. In the circumstances, and being uninformed
as to the full context of the written sentence, it would seem that the oral
statements, made when the phrase was being specifically discussed, should be
accepted as accurately expressing BNDD's opinion on the point. The only
alternative is to conclude that Mr. Ingersoll was not a reliable witness at
all and that none of his statements can be accepted. [12] P.L. 98-329, 98 Stat 280, June
29, 1984. See Appendix. [13] H.R. Rep. No. 98-534, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 4(1983) [14] See finding 27, page 45, below. [15] into a vein. [16] into the abdominal cavity. [17] "GG" = Drs. Grinspoon, et
al., exhibit; "G" = Agency exhibit